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Abstract 
 
This paper aims to analyse how the so-called ‘new generation’ European Union trade agreements 
can impact sustainable development policy of third countries, verifying whether such agreements 
are endowed with effective instruments that guarantee the implementation of the international 
commitments assumed with the aim to improve environmental and labour standards. In this sense, 
the presence of a specific dispute resolution instrument for the chapter on “Trade and Sustainable 
Development”, distinct from the one provided for the commercial part, on one hand highlights 
the relevance of the differentiated treatment granted to such issues. On the other hand, it also 
denotes the fragility of a system based solely on cooperation, which does not provide for the direct 
imposition of any type of sanction. Given this scenario, the purpose of this study is to reflect on 
the limitations and potential of ‘new generation’ trade agreements concerning the promotion of 
sustainable development in third countries and the possible ways to overcome the challenges 
inherent in building an economical sustainable society. 
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The EU trade policy was significantly reshaped with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2007, 
guided by much broader objectives than the mere progressive abolition of the trade and 
investment restrictions. Although the EU has combined economic interests, political 
values, and other norms in its external relations, it has not indicated any priority among 
these objectives. The architecture of the EU’s new external action creates the legal basis 
that enables the coordination of the Common Commercial Policy with other foreign 
policies, as well as pursuing non-commercial objectives through trade1. 
The Lisbon Treaty clarifies the division of powers amongst the EU and the Union 
Member States and the Art. 3 (e) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU) provides the exclusive competence of the EU to legislate over the Common 
Commercial Policy. It means that it is the EU, and not the Member States, that legislates 
over trade matters and concludes international trade agreements, except for agreements 
covering mixed responsibility issues, that can be concluded by the Council only after all 
Member States ratified it2. 
In the field of international trade agreements, the first issue elaborated by the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) through advisory opinion procedure concerns the nature and 
division of EU competence. In the Opinion no. 1/943, the CJEU favoured the 
Communities’ possibility to sign international trade agreements annexed to the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) constitutive agreements. Further on, Opinion no. 2/154 holds 
great importance as it defines the EU’s exclusive competence over international trade 
matters, following the extended new definition provided by the 2007 Treaty of Lisbon on 
the common commercial policy. The issue was first raised in light of the EU-Singapore 
Free Trade Agreement5, being then submitted to analysis of the CJEU. 
Indeed, the Treaty of Lisbon introduced a series of significant changes in the EU 
foreign policy, preserving many of the changes previously proposed by the unsuccessful 
Treaty that aimed to establish a European Constitution in 20046. Amongst those, the 
Council’s decision-making process reform and the enlargement of powers of the 
European Parliament regarding the conclusion of international trade agreements. 
                                                 
1 S. Gstöhl’, D. Hanf, The EU’s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements: Commercial Interests in a Changing 
Constitutional Context, in European Law Journal, Vol. 20 No. 6, 2014, p. 736. 
2 For encompassing matters beyond the trade of industrial goods, the “new generation” FTAs are generally 
defined as mixed agreements. For a more detailed analysis of this typology, see: C. Hillion, P. Koutrakos 
(eds.), Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and Its Member States in the World, Hart Publishing, London, 
2010. 
3 CJEU, Opinion No. 1/94 according to art. 228 (6) of the CE Treaty “Competence of the Comunity to 
negotiate international agreements in matters of services and intellectual property protection”, 15 
November 1994.  
4 CJEU, Opinion No. 2/15, according to art. 218 (11), CJEU “European Union-Singapore Free Trade 
Agreement – ‘new generation’ Agreement negotiated after the entry into force of the EU and FEU Treaties 
– Competence to negotiate agreements”, 16 May 2017. 
5 T. Von Danwitz, Les accords externs de l’Union Européenne en matière commerciale et la contribution 
de la Cour de Justice (Les dossiers européens: actualités), in Revue du Droit de l’Union européenne, No. 
2, 2018, p. 204. 
6 M. Cremona, The Draft Constitution Treaty: External Relations and External Action, in Common Market 
Law Review, Vol. 40 No. 6, 2003, pp. 1347-1366; S. Kurpas, The Treaty of Lisbon - How much 
‘Constitution’ is left? An Overview of the Main Changes, in CEPS Policy Brief, No. 147, 2007, pp. 1-9. 
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The general procedure for the EU to adopt international agreements, including those 
of commercial nature, is provided by article 218 of the TFEU. It is one of the provisions 
whose physiognomy was most altered since the European Communities’ creation in the 
1950s. Suffice to say that in 1957, article 228 of the then TCEE comprised only two sub-
paragraphs, whereas nowadays, it has eleven. This alteration made it possible to introduce 
substantial changes that, to a large extent, recognized the practice of the Community 
institutions and the consolidated jurisprudence of the CJEU7. Regarding trade 
agreements, the aforementioned provision approximates the procedures for concluding 
trade agreements to those adopted in the general procedure8, following the path previously 
proposed in the constitutional treaty. 
The prominent role of trade agreements lies precisely in the fact that it is through them 
that the EU manages its trade relations with third countries, being then designed to create 
better trade opportunities and overcome related barriers. Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) 
are often used as an indispensable economic tool by the EU in the internal market and are 
essential to its external policy. Yet, these are not the only instruments the European 
integration process disposes of in international trade9. There are also Association 
Agreements10, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements11, Economic Partnership 
Agreements that support the development of trade partners in African, Caribbean, and 
Pacific States12, as well as other bilateral instruments13 that vary according to its content. 
The impact of these agreements to its signatories is verified through significant 
numbers extracted from the already existing commercial relations and their effects in 
other affected areas, such as the generation of jobs. According to the latest Commission 
Report on Implementation of Free Trade Agreements for 201814, 39% of the EU trade in 
goods with third countries is covered by preferential trade agreements, including those 
with Japan, Singapore, and Vietnam. If the EU-Mercosur15 political agreement, 
announced on June 28, 2019, was also considered, this figure would increase to 41%. The 
EU trading partners make proper use of the preferences, reaching an average usage rate 
of 87%. Besides, a study16 found that 36 million jobs in the EU rely on exports to third 
                                                 
7 M. Cienfuegos Mateo, Los procedimientos de celebración de acuerdos Internacionales por la Unión 
Europeas tras el Tratado de Lisboa, JM Bosch editor, Barcelona, 2017, p. 35. 
8 Idem, p. 149. 
9A. Van Waeyenberge, P. Pecho, Free Trade Agreements after the Treaty of Lisbon in the Light of the Case 
Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union, in European Law Journal, Vol. 20 No. 6, 2014, p. 750. 
10 Agreements with Greece in 1961 and with Turkey in 1963.  
11 Agreement with Russia in 1994. Besides Russia, the EU concluded seven other agreements of Partnership 
and Cooperation or agreements of an enhanced partnership with non-EU member States: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan. For an updated list of the Agreements 
with Russia, Transcaucasia, and Central Asia, see: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:r17002.  
12 The Yaoundré Convention of 1963, providing cooperation with 18 African States. 
13 Agreement with Switzerland in 1999 for the free movement of people.  
14 Report of the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and Social Committee 
and the Regions Committee on the application of free trade agreements, 1st of January 2018 – 31st of 
December 2018 [SWD (2019) 370 final], published on 14 October 2019, p. 4 and p. 7. 
15 On the impact of commercial relationships of the EU and Mercosur, and specially for Brazil, see: A.B. 
de Moura, O impacto do Acordo Mercosul-União Europeia para o Brasil, in Revista Consultor Jurídico, 
julho-2019, available at: https://www.conjur.com.br/2019-jul-03/aline-moura-impacto-acordo-mercosul-
ue-brasil. 
16 EU Exports to the world and its effects on labor. Available at: 
 
 
 
 
Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
n. 1/2021 ISSN 2612-6672 | DOI 10.13130/2612-6672/15643 | 82  
 
countries and that jobs related to this type of export increased by 66% between 2000 and 
2017. 
Considering this data, it appears that there is a high rate of preferential trade 
agreements use by exporters, a fact that has a major impact on the EU economy, and this 
application stems from the Common Commercial Policy adopted with the Lisbon Treaty, 
which redefined several of its parameters. To better understand the legal and political 
effects of ‘new generation’ free trade agreements on relations with third countries and its 
objective of promoting the EU non-economic values, this paper will then present an in-
depth analysis of this issue. 
 
2. New Generation of Free Trade Agreements and the Promotion of Sustainable 
Development 
 
The so-called ‘new generation’ agreements are regional agreements established by 
numerous States, which are not necessarily neighbouring countries in the geographical 
meaning but have some similarities regarding economic policies17. The will of the 
European Union to bolster such initiative was officially presented in the statement 
“Global Europe: Competing in the world”18 in 2006. On its basis, one of the main 
objectives of the Commission was to surmount the stagnated multilateral negotiations 
amongst WTO countries and focus on the defence and competitiveness of their own 
enterprises19. 
The commercial strategy “Global Europe” ended the 1999 “Lamy Doctrine”, which 
had levied a moratorium over new free trade bilateral agreements, favouring the 
multilateral commercial round. The new strategy aimed at enduring the EU 
competitiveness by opening its market to emerging ones, signing free trade agreements, 
assuring that «the fundamental economic criteria for the new FTA must be their market 
potential (size and economic growth) and the level of protection against EU interest in 
exporting matters (custom law and technical barriers) ». Amongst potential partners, the 
Commission indicated the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)20, Southern 
Common Market (Mercosur)21, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)22, South Korea, India, 
Russia, and China23.  
                                                 
 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2018/november/tradoc_157516.pdf.  
17 M.R. Calamita, La clausola ISDS negli accordi commerciali di ultima generazione dell’Unione europea, 
in Diritto pubblico comparato ed europeo, No. 2, 2017, p. 311. 
18 Communication from the Commission of 6 December 2006 “Global Europe: Europe’s trade defense 
instruments in a changing global economy - A Green Paper for public consultation”, COM (2006) 763 
final. 
19 M.R. Calamita, La clausola, cit., p. 312. 
20 ASEAN was created on August 8th, 1967. It is a regional integration organization aimed at promoting 
economic development and political stability in the region. Currently, its members are Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar (Burma), Thailand, and Vietnam.   
21 It is a regional integration organization created on March 26th, 1991, and it comprises Brazil, Argentine, 
Uruguay, and Paraguay. 
22 Founded on May 25th, 1981, the GCC is an economic integration organization that unites the Gulf States 
like Oman, United Arabic Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait. 
23 European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Social and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Global Europe: 
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The multilateral agenda based on WTO works/projects was indeed the focus of 
European trade policy from 1999 to the middle 2000s. However, the evolution of the 
international economy, the positioning of some of its main rivals, the emergence of new 
commercial powers from emerging markets, and the disappointment with the Doha 
Round situation triggered political shifting in some EU preferential trade agreements24. 
The EU free trade agreement policies and its objectives established in “Global Europe” 
2006 were later confirmed by the “Trade, Growth and World Affairs” Communiqué in 
201025. This document prescribes a significant liberalization of goods and services, 
including investments, and rolls out numerous rules envisaging a better application of 
norms and international standards, such as those from WTO26. The Commission presents 
significant changes in its positioning, mainly because it conceives a noteworthy place for 
regional and bilateral trade agreements, fostering a focus shifting that was before 
traditionally exclusive for multilateral agreements27. 
In addition to that, with an eye on one of the EU goals of achieving a role consistent 
with its economic power to lead foreign affairs and global governance, the Commission 
also emphasizes that it is necessary to foster specific commercial arrangements and 
promote human rights, environmental protection, and labour rights, as well as good 
governance, including fiscal matters28. 
In 2017, the European Commission published a slew of proposals, recommendations, 
and political documents to announce the debut of a new era for the EU trade policies. The 
Commission carries out an account of the Commercial and Investment Strategy entitled 
“Commerce for all”29 from 2015. It strengthens the EU position in the ‘global value 
chain’, responds to the CJEU Advisory decision No. 02/2015 on Free Trade Agreement 
with Singapore, as well as regulates the imbalance between the values and interests that 
the EU must espouse and bolster in its commercial relations with the world30. 
The EU Common Trade Policy’s lynchpin lingers exactly on the promotion of non-
economic values, which one can encounter in the ‘new generation’ agreements. The 
mention of the EU foreign affairs in article 3 (5) of the Treaty on EU (TEU) contains a 
special reference to commerce and sustainable development. Putting aside some 
commitments such as peace promotion, security, human rights protection, solidarity, and 
                                                 
Competing in the World: A Contribution to the EU’s Growth and Jobs Strategy, COM (2006) 567 final, p. 
10. 
24 S. Woolcock, EU Policy on Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s: A Reorientation towards 
Commercial Aims, in European Law Journal, Vol. 20 No. 6, 2014, pp. 720-722. 
25 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 9 November 2010 “Trade, Growth and World 
Affairs – Trade Policy as a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy” COM (2010) 612 final. 
26 S. Woolcock, EU Policy on Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s, cit., p. 723. 
27 A. Antimiani, L. Salvatici, Regionalism versus Multilateralism: the case of the European Union Trade 
Policy, in Journal of World Trade, Vol. 49 No. 2, 2015, p. 256. 
28 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions of 9 November 2010 “Trade, Growth and World 
Affairs - Trade Policy as a core component of the EU’s 2020 strategy”, COM (2010) 612 final, pp. 17-18. 
29 G. Adinolfi, Alla ricerca di un equilibrio tra interessi economici e tutela dell’ambiente nella politica 
commerciale dell’Unione europea, in Rivista Eurojus, May 2017. Available at: http://rivista.eurojus.it/alla-
ricerca-di-un-equilibrio-tra-interessi-economici-e-tutela-dellambiente-nella-politica-commerciale-
dellunione-europea/. 
30 Editorial Comments, in Common Market Law Review, Vol. 55, 2018, p. 373. 
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mutual respect amongst peoples, it is possible to see the emergence of the objectives of 
fostering «free and equitable trade» and the «development of a sustainable planet», which 
become «a component piece in the common trade policy» according to the CJEU31. 
This rule is similar to article 21 of the Treaty on EU, which includes sustainable 
development to the goals of the EU foreign affairs, and to its paragraph (2), letters d, e, 
and f¸ that makes express reference to the promotion of sustainable development in 
economic, social and environmental plans of developing countries. These rules also refer 
to underpinning integration of all countries to the world economy by progressively 
eliminating obstacles to international commerce; and to the contribution for the 
development of international measures in order to preserve and enhance the quality of the 
environment and sustainable management of natural resources in global scale, with the 
purpose to ensure sustainable development. In ties with that are articles 9 and 11 TEU, 
which require social and environmental protection in all policies and activities of the EU 
«with the purpose to foster sustainable development». 
According to the EU Parliament in its observation on the authorization of trade 
negotiations with Singapore, the goal is by all odds the promotion of ‘new generation’ 
agreements. That means an agreement that comprises beyond the classical elements of 
this kind of agreement, such as reducing tariff and non-tariff obstacles to the trade of 
goods and services, «other relevant aspects, even essential ones, to trade» 32. 
Certainly, the EU common trade policy and the ‘new generation’ free trade agreements 
nowadays are inserted in a critical conjecture. Pursuing issues, such as ‘mundialization’, 
the challenge of Brexit, and the US new trade strategy, the CJEU has also contributed to 
clarifying some matters. It always guides itself by acknowledging the importance of such 
treaties to the EU to achieve economic growth and prosperity and allow a crucial 
regulation of various economic, social, and political interests existing in the EU through 
legal instruments33. 
Indeed, the CJEU’s decisions point out some non-commercial matters that can be 
discussed in an international agreement. Fundamental rights can also be foreseen in trade 
and investment agreements, as stated in the CJEU Advisory Opinion No. 01/1734 by 
demand of Belgium on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with 
Canada, concerning the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and freedom of enterprise, 
property rights, and social rights35. 
Regarding the Sustainable Development Goals, the already mentioned CJEU Advisory 
Opinion No. 02/15 ruled that the social protection of labour and environmental protection 
are part of the EU Common Trade Policies36. Therefore, beyond the classical elements of 
trade agreements, such as reducing tariffs and non-tariff barriers levied upon goods and 
services, the ‘new generation’ agreements include rules deemed relevant under other 
aspects, which are essential for commercial exchange37. 
                                                 
31 CJEU, Advisory Opinion No. 02/15, para. 147. 
32 CJEU, Advisory Opinion No. 02/15, para. 140. 
33 T. Von Danwitz, Les accords externs de l’Union Européenne, cit., p. 203. 
34 CJEU, Advisory Opinion from Oct. 13th, 2017. 
35 T. Von Danwitz, Les accords externs de l’Union Européenne, cit., p. 203. 
36 CJEU, Advisory Opinion No. 02/15, para. 147. 
37 T. Von Danwitz, Les accords externs de l’Union Européenne, cit., p. 204. 
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Regarding that, the EU makes use of FTA’s in order to emphasize international 
standards in areas of deeper integration, with the aim to warrant that the rules developed 
in the main markets of its partners be consistent with EU standards. Hence, these 
agreements have two particular aspects that merit attention. On the one hand, they 
envisage to a certain extent the ‘export’ of EU fundamental values to EU’s partners, thus 
enhancing the constitutional rights of non-EU citizens. On the other hand, they provoke 
internal impacts, for protecting their own citizens by establishing criteria as a precondition 
to more ambitious trade liberalization38. 
The adoption of this new EU trade policy reflects on third countries and can spur 
positive and negative impacts. Although it may sound positive that the EU stimulates its 
partners to ratify the UN or the International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions and 
engage in domestic civil society organizations, it also imposes a commercial agenda, 
especially on economically and politically weaker countries, which interferes in many 
domestic issues. Therefore, EU trade policy generally became more responsible, yet not 
necessarily more liberal39. 
In this path, it is relevant to those willing to export and sell within the EU territory to 
observe European regulations’ strictness on labour and environmental protection. Even 
for those that belong/come from third countries, products must be in accordance with the 
EU rules, such as Directive (EU) No. 2019/904 on the reduction of the impact of certain 
plastic products on the environment, which will enter into force in July 2021 and impose 
stiff conditions for the movement of goods, including those imported from third countries. 
The legal basis for these obligations can be found in the “Trade and Sustainable 
Development” (TSD) Chapter, featured in all EU trade agreements of the ‘new 
generation’, which will be discussed further. 
 
3. Trade and Sustainable Development 
 
The “Trade and Sustainable Development” (TDS) chapters in EU trade agreements, 
which are typical for the ‘new generation’ ones, represent an endeavour to integrate social 
and environmental aspects to the trade policy goals. This chapter has its own 
characteristics and encompasses three matters: i) commitments to implement key ILO 
conventions and multilateral environmental agreements; ii) commitments to not reduce 
labour and environmental standards, in order to improve trade and attract investments 
(non-regression clause); and iii) obligations on sustainable management of natural 
resources, suppression of illegal commerce (e.g. threatened species) and cooperation by 
means of social responsibility of enterprises and ethical trading initiatives40. 
When implementing labour and environmental protection, the EU trade policy 
indicates a global approach of trade factors and sustainable development, which until then 
were conceived separately. Thus, economic, and social growth, as well as environmental 
protection, are understood as interdependent concepts and become part of sustainable 
                                                 
38 S. Gstöhl, D. Hanf, The EU’s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements, cit., p. 735. 
39 idem, p. 748. 
40 Editorial Comments, cit., p. 384. 
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development, which support each other and contribute to the establishment of a welfare 
state for present and future generations41. 
Hence, the TSD Chapter is not independent of the trade policy, meaning that it creates 
new and separate obligations; it is, in fact, a part of it, ensuring that «trade [between 
parties] occurs in respect to obligations from international conventions on matters like 
social and environmental protection, to which they are parties»42. Considering this trade 
policy, the CJEU binds fair trade to sustainable development, and the latter is defined 
based on specific multilateral conventions on the main labour rights and environmental 
protection. 
The CJEU Advisory Opinion No. 02/2015 analysed the TSD Chapter, from the point 
of view of competence distribution and its legal fundaments, clarifying the material 
concept of the EU trade policy. As presented by the Advocate-General43, the CJEU could 
have declared that the obligations of this Chapter are merely accessories and punctual to 
the main relevant goals of the agreement or that they represent sufficiently independent 
obligations to demand a separate legal base. Instead, the Court chose to redefine the scope 
and objectives of the EU trade policy pursuant to general goals that guide all external 
action and to article 207(1) of the EUFT, meaning that the common trade policy is 
conducted «accordingly to» the principles and objectives of the Unions’ external 
actions44. 
In this sense, the EU free trade agreements’ content reveals their immediate trade 
objectives and includes strategic trade interests, which seek to entice rules from trade and 
international investment systems to guarantee that the EU set of rules be consistent with 
international tendencies45. 
Pursuant to the ‘new generation’ agreements, trade must foster sustainable 
development. Thus all involved countries must endeavour to bolster trade and economic 
influxes while ensuring dignifying labour and environmental protection, especially in 
order to stimulate: i) the development and use of voluntary regimes related to the 
sustainable production of goods and services, as well as enhanced voluntary activities on 
social issues by enterprises, some of which can be found in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) guidelines for multinational corporations; ii) 
integration of sustainable issues in decisions related to consuming in public and private 
sectors; and iii) creation, establishment, maintenance or improvement of goals and rules 
of environmental performance46. 
According to what has been established by the UN Human Rights Charter, observance 
to democratic principles and human rights must guide the parties’ domestic and 
international policies and is an essential element in the EU trade agreements; moreover, 
when they are not preceded by political and cooperation dialogue47. 
                                                 
41 Art. 22.1 (1) from Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada 
from 2016.  
42 CJEU, Advisory Opinion No. 02/15, para. 152. 
43 Conclusions of the General-Advocate Eleanor Sharpston, presented on 21 Dec. 2016. 
44 Editorial Comments, cit., p. 384 
45 S. Woolcock, EU Policy on Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s, cit., p. 724. 
46 Art. 22.3 (2), CETA. 
47 S. Woolcock, EU Policy on Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s, cit., p. 730. That was the case 
of the Agreement with Colombia and Peru, where art. 1 prescribes human rights without any Agreement 
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The way rights and obligations related to sustainable development appear and how 
they are inserted in those agreements are unique. In general, these commitments are 
connected to the parties’ obligations to effectively apply certain multilateral treaties that 
have been negotiated by other international organizations, regarding labour rights and 
environmental protection, which create new obligations directly emerging from the trade 
agreement. 
Therefore, either the agreements are generally related to other international 
commitments48 or they mention specific international instrument49, which may be 
thoroughly enumerated and also include the duty to ratify and apply environmental 
treaties that have already been signed by the parties50. 
By comparing the provisions on sustainable development in the EU ‘new generation’ 
agreements signed with its trade partners, one can see similarities and particular remarks, 
depending on the analyzed country. 
The EU trade agreement with Colombia and Peru from 201251, which Ecuador later 
joined in 201652, establishes several particular provisions to the parties, in order to respect 
labour and environmental norms53, including some items dedicated to «biological 
diversity», «trade in forest products», «trade in products» and «climate change»54. 
Interestingly, it is the only agreement that mentions labour migration in the TSD Chapter. 
Under article 276, entitled «migrant workers», countries may seek «equality of treatment 
in respect of working conditions, to eliminate any discrimination in respect thereof to any 
workers, including migrant workers legally employed in their territories». 
Further reference to migration in the ‘new generation’ agreement is only found in the 
FTA signed with Central America in 2012, with the following States: Costa Rica, 
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. Although it is not allocated in 
the TSD chapter, migration issues are encompassed in a broader sense in the «Institutional 
framework» and «Social Development and Social Cohesion»55. These chapters regulate 
the idea of migration by the movement of workers and the protection of refugees. Besides, 
it establishes the obligation to the parties to effectively implement eight ILO conventions 
and other eight treaties on environmental matters, that the Agreement thoroughly lists56. 
                                                 
on Political Dialogue and Cooperation. In this case, there is no monitoring mechanism, thus the problem is 
addressed by the general trade committee. 
48 Art. 22.1 (3, c), CETA. 
49Art. 13.5 (3) of the EU-Korea Agreement. It expressively mentions the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, 
and the Bali Plan of Action; arts. 267 (2, b), 269, and 270 of the EU-Colombia, Peru and Ecuador 
Agreement from 2012; arts. 285.1, 286, and 287 from the Agreement with Central America 2012; arts. 12.2, 
12.3 and 12.6 of the EU-Singapore agreement 2019; arts. 16.3 (2) and 16.4 (4) of the EU-Japan agreement 
2019; arts. 13.2, 13.4 and 13.5 of the EU-Vietnam agreement 2016.  
50 S. Gstöhl; D. Hanf, The EU’s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements, cit., p. 743. 
51 Free Trade Agreement between EU and Colombia and Peru (JO L 354 de 21.12.2012). 
52 Protocol of Accession of Ecuador to the EU-Colombia and Peru agreement (JO L 356 de 24.12.2016, pp. 
3-1456). 
53 The art. 269 (3) of the EU-Colombia, Peru and Ecuador agreement prescribes that the main conventions 
of the ILO must be ratified and effectively implemented. 
54 Arts. 272-275 of the EU-Colombia, Peru and Ecuador agreement. 
55 Arts. 19-49 of the EU-Central America Agreement. 
56 Art. 286.2 prescribes the respect to the ILO Conventions No. 138, 182, 105, 29, 100, 111, 87, and 98.  
Art. 287 establishes that parties shall commit to the following multilateral agreements: Montreal Protocol 
on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer from 1987, Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary. Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, Stockholm Convention on persistent 
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In addition to that, it includes two provisions related to «trade in forest products» and 
«trade in products»57. 
The 2012 agreement with Korea, the EU’s first one with an Asian country, establishes 
the duty for the parties to implements ILO conventions already signed and to ratify those 
that have not yet been signed. On environmental matters, parties compromise to achieve 
the final goal of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change and Kyoto 
Protocol, as well as to observe Bali Action Plan’s guidelines58. In this agreement, one 
cannot find specific provisions on certain areas of environmental protection, and there is 
only one generic provision on «trade favouring sustainable development»59. 
In the free trade agreement between EU and Singapore in 2019, parties commit to 
guarantee that trade would respect international convention obligations concerning labor 
and environmental protection matters, envisaging the effective implementation of the 
principles and rights therein60, while referring to the ILO conventions ratified by the 
parties61 and to the UNFCCC goals and its Kyoto and Paris Protocols62. Besides, the 
agreement establishes specific provisions on “trade in timber and timber products” and 
«trade in fish products»63. 
Particularly, the agreement with Vietnam in 2020 makes clear that sustainable 
development goes on a pair with economic and social development and environmental 
protection, and that these three aspects «constitute three interdependent issues which 
underpin each other»64. In respect to international duties, the parties stress their 
commitment to endeavour to ratify the main ILO Conventions that they have not ratified 
yet. In the environmental field, the TSD chapter states its own provisions to regulate 
matters on «climate change», «biological diversity», «sustainable management of forests 
and trade in forest products», «trade and sustainable management of living marine 
resources and aquaculture products», «trade and investment favouring sustainable 
development»65, which include a myriad of international treaties to be duly observed by 
the parties. 
The FTA with Japan mentions duties derived from ILO66 and from international 
treaties on environmental matters, while similar to the Agreement with Vietnam, are 
rolled out on the following items: «trade and investment favouring sustainable 
development», «biological diversity», «sustainable forest management and trade in forest 
                                                 
organic pollutants, Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol; and ratify until the date of entry into force of the FTA with the EU 
the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and 
Pesticides in International Trade. 
57 Arts. 289 and 290 of the EU-Central America Agreement. 
58 Arts. 13.4 (3) and 13.4 (3) of the EU-Korea Agreement. 
59 Art. 13.6 of the EU-Korea Agreement. 
60 T. Von Danwitz, Les accords externs de l’Union Européenne, cit., p. 204. 
61 Art. 12.3 of the EU-Singapore Agreement. 
62 Art. 12.6 (3) of the EU-Singapore Agreement. 
63 Arts. 12.7 and 12.8 of the EU-Singapore Agreement. 
64 Art. 13.1.3 of the EU-Vietnam Agreement. 
65 Art. 13.6 of the EU-Vietnam Agreement. 
66 Art. 16.3 (2) of the EU-Japan Agreement. 
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products», «trade and sustainable management of living marine resources and aquaculture 
products»67. 
In a broader view, the FTA with Canada in 201768 states that the parties intend to 
endorse the application of the respective labour and environmental laws and respect 
international agreements on labour and environmental issues. Nonetheless, it does not 
impose any specific duty related to compliance with a specific international treaty as it is 
in the other trade agreements. Albeit apparently hasty, both issues are deeply regulated 
along two dedicated chapters entitled “Trade and Labour”, “Trade and Environment”, 
which follow the traditional chapter entitled “Trade and Sustainable Development”69. By 
displacing labour and environmental provisions to specific chapters, negotiators point out 
a distinguished position compared to the other ‘new generation’ agreements. The TSD 
Chapter brings principles of sustainable development and prescribes, in a broader view, 
the guidelines that are better explained in the labour and trade chapters. 
The FTA announced in 2019 between the EU and Mercosur, a Latin-American 
integration process involving Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, is still being 
subjected to a legal and technical revision of its texts. The agreement signed with 
Mercosur is the most significant that the EU has ever negotiated, considering the 
economic point of view. Mercosur and the EU represent together 25% of the global GGP, 
equivalent to € 19 tri, and a market demand of 773 million people. The EU is currently 
the second major Mercosur’s partner, after China, and Mercosur is the 8th main extra 
regional partner of the EU. Pursuant to the European Commission data70, the total amount 
of bi-regional trade in products and services was around € 122 bi in 2018. To make it 
feasible to comprehend, European enterprises will save more than € 4 bi per year in 
customs duties, which is four times bigger than the FTA signed with Japan in 201871. 
The Agreement with Mercosur also encompasses a TSD chapter, which prescribes 
commitments to international treaties on labour and environmental issues, as well as 
matters on «trade and climate change», «trade and biodiversity», «trade and sustainable 
forest management», «trade and sustainable management of living marine resources and 
aquaculture products», in which the Sustainable Development Goals of the UN 2030 
Agenda are constantly mentioned. 
The environmental issue has been a constant in critics from European governments 
and foreign institutions, majorly due to fires in the Amazon region and the Brazilian 
negligence towards the Paris Agreement72. A report prepared by the London School of 
Economics in July 202073 analysed more deeply the impact that the environmental issues 
                                                 
67 Arts. 16.5-16.8 of the EU-Japan Agreement. 
68 Art. 22.1 (3, c) of the EU-CETA. 
69 Arts. 22,23 and 24 of the EU-CETA respectively. 
70 EU and Mercosur reach agreement on trade. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_19_3396?fbclid=IwAR3Be_1CVRoXUpPqpq2
xVdKCsC6F2B5ZBOHEF2MfZdqX7Rfryd-etNBELTg. 
71 A. B. de Moura, O impacto do Acordo Mercosul-União Europeia para o Brasil, cit. 
72 Three European Parliaments (Austrian, Netherland, and that from the Belgium region of Wallonia) 
already declared that they will not ratify the agreement. 
73 Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) in Support of the Association Agreement Negotiations between 
the European Union and Mercosur. Draft Final Report, London School of Economics and Political Science 
(LSE), July 2020. The European Commission generally recurred to private firms to have SIA’s elaborated 
for its trade agreements and published it on the Commission’s website. 
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have over the agreement. In accordance with the report, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay 
have great weight in the sector of clean energy production74, whereas data from 2004 and 
2012 show that, while Brazil considerably reduced the rate of deforestation, there has 
been an increase of the agricultural production. This indicates that agriculture and meat 
production are not obstacles to forest protection; however, the latter hinges even more on 
public policies’ effectiveness75. Data also point out that there was an increase in logging 
in Brazil from 2012 to 2018, followed by a significant increase of +29, 5% in 2019, which 
has been superior to the annual rate of deforestation registered in any las decade year. 
Nevertheless, it rested below rates registered in any year from 1988 to 200876. The report 
limited itself to examine the macroeconomic impacts of the future trade agreement but 
did not raise any specific environmental problems, such as the numerous environmental 
initiatives announced in the communication “The European Green Deal”77 by the 
Commission at the end of 201978. 
The EU Ombudsman has presented a complaint questioning the Commission’s leading 
of the negotiations with Mercosur79. The main argument is that the EU announced an 
agreement without any adequate environmental evaluation and concluded it after 
analysing out-of-date info on potential social, economic, and environmental impacts of 
the agreement. The question still lingers uncertain, and it is necessary to wait until the 
following outcomes to analyse the future of the EU-Mercosur Agreement, whose 
negotiations commenced more than 20 years ago. 
After a systematic review of the ‘new generation’ agreements presented above, all but 
that with Canada prescribe duties, so the parties adopt or change their legislation and their 
domestic policies, according to relevant international rules and to the agreements to which 
they are parties, explicitly mentioning a list of multilateral treaties on labour and 
environmental issues. Notwithstanding that, CETA is the only agreement with specific 
chapters dedicated to trading under labour and environmental perspectives. Except for the 
one with Korea, all the analysed agreements contain provisions of specific environmental 
matters, such as climate change, biological diversity, forest management, and fishery. 
Hence, it is observable that these agreements are flexible according to different levels of 
protection, in accordance with particularities and especial needs of each country to adapt 
to the minimum required international standards of sustainable development. 
Lastly, regarding the EU-Mercosur Agreement, there is not one single common 
commitment to improving the protection of the environment in either the EU or in the 
Mercosur countries to guarantee ‘sustainable development’. Furthermore, no sanctions 
                                                 
74 According to the Report (p.77), in 2014, 73% of the energy production in Brazil was renewable, 91% in 
Uruguay and 100% in Paraguay. Argentina produced 32%, but even more than in the EU, where the rate is 
29%. 
75 Sustainability Impact Assessment in Support of the Association Agreement Negotiations between the 
European Union and Mercosur. Draft Final Report, 2020, cit., p. 15. 
76 Idem, p. 78. 
77 European Commission. Communication from the Commission the European Green Deal Commission. 
COM (2019), Brussels, 2019. 
78 L. Kramer, A Lost Opportunity? The Environment and the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, in C. Derani; 
A.B. de Moura, P. G. Noschang (eds), Regulamentação europeia sobre água, energia e alimentos para a 
sustentabilidade ambiental, EMAIS, Florianópolis, 2020, p. 11. 
79 The initiative has the support of Federação Internacional de Direitos Humanos, ClientEarth, Fern, Veblen 
Institute and La Fondation Nicolas Hulot pour la Nature et l’Homme. 
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are foreseen should the international environmental agreements listed in the Agreement 
not be implemented. Thus, as conceived under the Agreement, the sustainable 
development is nothing else than «business as usual»80 and the Parties missed the 
opportunity to elaborate an innovative and effective ‘new generation’ of free trade 
agreement.  
  
4. Dispute Resolution 
 
Considering that the TSD Chapter complements but does not replace the controlling 
mechanisms prescribed by the international agreement, any dispute related to the 
interpretation and application of this Chapter refrains from arbitral tribunals provided by 
trade agreements81. Thus, the Chapter enjoys a relative autonomy comparing to the other 
trade provisions, adopting a cooperative approach and including its own instruments82, as 
the enduring of capacities, incentive measures, monitoring and dialogue83. 
The TSD Chapter’s implementation is typically monitored by a specialized Committee 
composed of high representatives of the parties. In some cases, dialogues with civil 
society are established through advisory groups formed by independent organizations of 
civil society, which represent equally distributed environmental, labour and commercial 
organizations, as well as other groups of interest. This can be found in the Agreements 
with Korea84 and Colombia, Peru and Ecuador85. In addition to that, a meeting of civil 
society, composed by all civil society organizations, must take place from time to time, 
with the aim to establish a dialogue on the agreement’s sustainable development aspects. 
Notwithstanding the possibility of sanction-based application as an alternative to 
bolster the TSD Chapter, the European Commission strongly objected it. The 
Commission argues that a sanction-based application that the USA and Canada spur 
protects domestic producers against unfair competition (‘social dumping’). The EU, in its 
turn, would rather adopt an approach that allows conditions for an equitable competition 
based on multilateral standards in order to combine the two key elements of fair trade86. 
Therefore, it is not feasible to apply any sanction in non-observance cases of the 
provisions contained in the mentioned chapter. For instance, the infringement does not 
allow countermeasures, except for the only case where the trade agreement refers to an 
                                                 
80 L. Kramer, A Lost Opportunity? The Environment and the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement, cit., p. 12. 
81 G. Adinolfi, Alla ricerca di un equilibrio tra interessi economici e tutela dell’ambiente nella politica 
commerciale dell’Unione europea, cit. 
82 A. Semertzi, The Preclusion of Direct Effect in the Recently Concluded EU Free Trade Agreements, in 
Common Market Law Review, Vol. 51, 2014, p. 1141. 
83 Arts. 23.11 and 24.16 of the EU-CETA; Arts. 13.16 and 13.17 of the EU0 South Korea Agreement; Arts. 
12.15-12(17) of the EU-Singapore Agreement; Art. 284 of the EU-Colombia, Peru and Ecuador Agreement; 
Art. 297 of the EU-Central America Agreement. 
84 Art. 13.12(5) and 13.13 of the EU-South Korea Agreement from 14 May 2011. 
85 Art. 282 of the EU-Colombia, Peru, and Ecuador Agreement. 
86 In this view, fair trade can simply mean following the rules, but these rules are no more limited to the 
WTO provisions. They have a broader scope and include provisions projected to guarantee equitable 
conditions and criteria that derive directly or indirectly from general international law and multilateral 
conventions on labour rights or environment. Certainly, the balance between the different dimensions of 
free and equitable trade will hinge on the EU’s interests and will be arranged according to its trade partners, 
which vary in terms of economic development and political views. See: Editorial Comments, 2018, pp. 
385-386. 
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international treaty that encompasses commercial restrictions against the wrongdoer, as 
in the case of the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer from 
198787. Moreover, any party that may not be in accordance with it must bring out a plan 
of action, and the Trade and Sustainable Development Sub-Committee shall monitor its 
implementation88. 
The combination of broadly established standards and a weak mechanism of coercion, 
mainly grounded on consultative procedures, can be qualified as the most recent outcome 
of the ‘legal inflation’ in the FTA’s89. Nonetheless, in the long term, it can help monitor 
and progressively promoting the end of these goals through a slow though constant 
political process of awareness of governments, civil society, and trade community. The 
Commission’s position goes in ties with the idea of «allowing civil society, including its 
social partners, to perform their role regarding the application [of the TSD Chapter]»90. 
Albeit the absence of any sanction originated directly from the TSD Chapter, the CJEU 
has already declared that the infringement of any provision on labour and environmental 
protection allows the injured party to «end the trade liberalization brought on by other 
provisions of the agreement or to discontinue it»91, based on the international custom law 
written down in article 60 (1) of the Convention on the Law of Treaties from 196992, 
which is plainly applicable to EU relations with third countries93.  
In conclusion, the ‘new generation’ agreements are an important regulation tool when 
considering the globalization process, allowing the EU to face the challenges created by 
the different levels of social and environmental protection without resorting to 
multilateral treaties. The celebration of such agreements allows the prevention of the 
social model typical for western society against all attempt to initiate a «Race to the 
bottom», also known as «course vers le bas»94. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
87 Art. 4 of the Montreal Protocol on Control of trade with non-Parties, which prescribes that parties shall 
prohibit importation of controlled substances from any country that is not party to the Protocol, as well as 
refrain from providing subsides, aid, credits, guarantees or insurance programmes for the export to States 
not party to this Protocol of products, equipment, plants, or technology that would facilitate the production 
of controlled substances. G. Adinolfi, Alla ricerca di un equilibrio tra interessi economici e tutela 
dell’ambiente nella politica commerciale dell’Unione europea, cit. 
88 S. Woolcock, EU Policy on Preferential Trade Agreements in the 2000s, cit., pp. 729-730. 
89 S. Gstöhl, D. Hanf, The EU’s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements, cit., p. 744. 
90 Report of the Commission to the EU Parliament, Council, Social and Economic Committee and to the 
Committee of regions on the application of free trade agreements, 1 Jan. 2018-31 Dec. 2018 [SWD (2019) 
370 final], p. 29. 
91 CJEU, Advisory Opinion No. 02/15, para.161. 
92 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969. 
93 For more details on the applicability of custom law to the Union’s foreign affairs that are stated in the 
Vienna Convention, see CJEU, Judgment Brita, C-386/08 of 25 Feb. 2010; CJEU, Judgment 
Council/Frente Polisário, C 104/16 of 21 December 2016. 
94 T. Von Danwitz, Les accords externs de l’Union européenne, cit., p. 207. 
